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Research Infrastructures (RI) and e-Infrastructures (EI) increasingly make use of national 
and global “Research and Education” (R&E) identity federations to facilitate their users’ 
access to RI/EI services. When requesting access to RI/EI services, users are directed to 
authenticate at their home organisation Identity Provider (IdP) using their home 
organisation credentials. The RI/EI may enrich the resulting authentication credential with 
community information to allow authorisation decisions to be made on the combined 
assertions.  For example, information about community roles, added to the token, may be 
mapped to rights and privileges. 
Studies in the AARC project [1] have shown that research communities often connect to a 
R&E federation using a Service Provider to Identity Provider proxy (SP-IdP proxy). In this 
model a single component, the SP-IdP proxy, also known as an AAI-Gateway, negotiates 
between the services in the RI/EI and the IdPs in the federation as shown in Figure 1. By 
positioning all RI/EI services behind a single proxy IdP, the RI/EI is shielded from the 
heterogeneity of the global R&E federations and itself need only be registered once, for all 
its services, as a single SP in the R&E federations. More details are presented in the 
AARC Blueprint Architecture [2] which identifies this model as a recommendation for 
research collaborations engaging with R&E federations. 
The use of the proxy model, however, poses policy challenges in establishing a sufficient 
level of trust between the RI/EI SPs and the federation IdPs, as the IdPs must be assured 
that the identity information they release will be treated appropriately by the RI/EI and its 
SPs. Depending on the number of communities supported, some RI/EI services may only 
see a single proxy IdP which they have to trust, but more generic service providers or EIs, 
supporting multiple research communities or RIs, may have to trust many proxy IdPs or 
many RIs. R&E federations can feel confident in releasing attributes to SP-IdP proxies 
that assert entity attributes related to, for example, REFEDS Research and Scholarship, 
data protection and/or security incident response [3]. The framework introduced in this 
Figure 1: The SP-IdP Proxy Model. Source: GÉANT, GN3PLUS13-642-23 
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paper enables the management of Research Infrastructures and e-Infrastructures to 
publish such assertions for the proxy on behalf of the Infrastructure as a whole. 
2 Introduction to the Snctfi Trust Framework 
This document addresses the problem of establishing the transitive trust described above. 
Building on the “Security for Collaboration among Infrastructures (SCI)” framework [4], it 
proposes the “Scalable Negotiator for a Community Trust framework in Federated 
Infrastructures” (Snctfi) as a policy and trust framework allowing determination of the 
'quality' of SP-IdP proxies and the RI/EI services they support. This framework places 
requirements on compliant RIs/EIs for an internally consistent policy set covering critical 
areas of best practice such as the protection of personal data and security incident 
handling capabilities. Compliant RIs/EIs are encouraged to assert relevant entity 
categories and assurance attributes [3] to assure federations and their IdPs that they can 
be trusted to act appropriately. The assertion by the SP-IdP proxy of additional qualifiers 
or tags, for example REFEDS Research and Scholarship, GÉANT data protection code of 
conduct and REFEDS Sirtfi, encourages the release of attributes from eduGAIN IdPs to 
the Infrastructure. The benefit of this approach is that each of the Infrastructure 
constituents no longer has to join an R&E federation and eduGAIN in order to assert its 
own compliance.  Furthermore, by addressing the structure of the security policy set that 
binds services supported by the SP-IdP proxy, Snctfi facilitates comparison between 
RIs/EIs. 
3 Scope 
This document applies to the set of SPs, group- and VO-management systems acting as 
Attribute Authorities, and the SP-IdP proxy, together comprising an e-Infrastructure or 
Research Infrastructure (hereafter called the “Infrastructure”). The individual SPs, Attribute 
Authorities and SP-IdP proxies are hereafter called the “Constituents” of the 
“Infrastructure”.  
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4 Normative Requirements 
We present normative requirements in this document in three areas: Operational Security, 
User Responsibilities and the Protection and Processing of Personal Data. 
An Infrastructure must address these requirements if asserting conformance with the 
Snctfi Trust Framework. 
4.1 Operational Security [OS] 
The aims of Operational Security in an Infrastructure include: 
 Preventing security incidents, wherever possible, via the timely handling of and 
patching of software vulnerabilities; 
 Minimising the impact of those security incidents that do occur by implementing 
appropriate logging, monitoring and incident handling capabilities sufficient to 
understand the causes and the controls necessary to contain the impact and 
prevent recurrence. 
 
The Infrastructure must:  
[OS1] define a set of common security requirements including stipulations on: 
authentication, authorisation, access control, physical and network security, security 
vulnerability handling and security incident handling, together with compliance 
mechanisms ensuring appropriate implementations. 
[OS2] ensure that its Constituents abide by the stipulations of the Infrastructure security 
requirements by means of, for example, binding contracts, MoUs, SLAs, OLAs, policies, 
or a suitable combination of these. 
[OS3] ensure that its Constituents meet all relevant requirements specified in REFEDS 
Sirtfi version 1.0 [5]. 
[OS4] define appropriate policies and procedures necessary to coordinate the 
implementation of [OS2] and [OS3] commensurate with the scale of the Infrastructure. 
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4.2 User Responsibilities [EU, RU, RC] 
To establish trust between the Infrastructure and the R&E federations, and between 
Infrastructures, the Infrastructure relies on appropriate behaviour by its users and user 
communities. 
[UR1] The Infrastructure must ensure that its users and user communities are aware that 
they have the responsibilities documented in this sub-section. 
4.2.1  Individual Users [RU] 
Each SP or the Infrastructure must provide: 
[RU1] an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP). The AUP must at least address the following 
areas: defined acceptable use, non-acceptable use, user registration, protection and use 
of credentials, data protection and privacy. 
[RU2] a process to ensure that all users are aware of, and accept the requirement to 
abide by, the AUP. 
[RU3] communication to their users of any changes to the AUP and/or additional 
restrictions or requirements on acceptable use that arise out of new collaborative 
partnerships (if any). 
4.2.2  Collections of Users [RC] 
A Collection of users is a group of individuals, organised with a common purpose, jointly 
granted access to the Infrastructure. It may serve as an entity which acts as the interface 
between the individual users and the Infrastructure. In general, the members of the 
Collection will not need to separately negotiate access with Service Providers or 
Infrastructures. 
Examples of Collections of users include, but are not limited to: User groups, Virtual 
Organisations, Research Communities, Research Infrastructures, Virtual Research 
Communities, Projects, Communities authorised to use particular portals or gateways, 
and geographically organised communities.  
 
Each Infrastructure must have: 
[RC1] policies and procedures regulating the behaviour of the management of the 
Collection of users in relation to individual user registration and membership management 
(registration, renewal, suspensions, removal, and banning). At a minimum, these must 
address the accuracy of individual user contact information both for initial collection and 
periodic renewal and related Data Protection issues (see later). 
[RC2] a process to ensure that all Collections of users using the Infrastructure are aware 
of, and accept the need to abide by, applicable Infrastructure policy requirements. 
 
The Infrastructure policies must require that Collections of users must: 
[RC3] be aware that inappropriate actions by individual members of the Collection may 
adversely affect the ability of other members to use the Infrastructure. 
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[RC4] ensure there is a way of identifying the individual responsible for an action. 
[RC5] record membership management actions as these may be needed in security 
incident response. 
[RC6] define their common aims and purposes, i.e. the research or scholarship goals of 
the group. They should make this available to the Infrastructure and/or Service Providers 
to allow them to make decisions on resource allocation. 
[RC7] inform the Infrastructure of any significant changes to common aim and purposes 
(see above). 
4.3 Protection and processing of Personal Data [DP] 
Infrastructure Constituents and, where necessary Collections of users, must have policies 
and procedures addressing the protection of the privacy of individual users, i.e. members 
of the Collections, with regard to the processing of their personal data (also known as 
Personally Identifiable Information or PII) collected as a result of their access to services 
provided by the Infrastructure.  
 
The Infrastructure must: 
[DP1] have a Data Protection Policy binding those Constituents and Collections of Users 
who process personal data to an appropriate policy framework, e.g. the GÉANT Data 
Protection Code of Conduct [6] or, for example, as recommended by AARC [7]. 
[DP2] ensure that all Constituents must provide, in a visible and accessible way, a Privacy 
Policy covering their processing of personal data for purposes that are necessary for the 
safe and reliable operation of their service, compliant with the Infrastructure policy (or 
policy framework). The availability of a Privacy Policy template for the Constituents to 
follow, provided by the Infrastructure, would help the easier production of such a policy.  
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